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BRIEF OF APPELLANT FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction

lies with

this

Court pursuant

Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992).

to

Utah

Code

This appeal is taken from

the Order denying defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur
entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, on March 25, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing defendant a new trial

by jury on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the standard
enunciated in Crookston, et al. v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P. 2d 789
(Utah 1991)?

1

Standard of Review;
The decision of the court to retroactively apply an overruling
decision is within the discretion of the court and as such will not
be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Loyal Order of

Moose, No. 259 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982).
2.
damage

Did the trial court err in refusing to remit the punitive

award

in

accordance

with

the

standards

set

forth

in

Crookston?
Standard of Review;
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a new trial due
to an excessive verdict, an appellate court will reverse only if
there is no reasonable basis for the decision.

Crookston v. Fire

Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991).
3.
before

Did the trial court err in considering facts not properly

it

in

ruling

on

defendant's

Motion

for

New

Trial

or

Remittitur?
Standard of Review;
Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of
fact.

Evidentiary

standard.

rulings

are

reviewed

under

a

correctness

Grayson, Ltd. Partnership v. Finlavson, 782 P.2d 467,

470 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 59 of that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
length

of this provision, the text will

appendix.

2

be set

Due to the

forth

in the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case now comes before the Utah Supreme Court for the
second time.

In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789

(Utah 1991) , this court vacated in part the trial court's denial of
defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and remanded the
action back to the trial court for reconsideration consistent with
this Court's opinion in Crookston.

The underlying facts of this

case were reviewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict
in this Court's opinion in Crookston.

In addition to the facts set

forth in this Court's opinion and the parties' briefs on file with
the

Court

in

the

first

appeal, Docket

No.

880034,

defendant

respectfully submits the following additional factual background to
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of trial, plaintiffs' expert economist, Paul
Randle, Ph.D., identified the type, extent and nature of damages
alleged to have been sustained by plaintiffs as a result of defendant's conduct, as follows:
Loss of equity position in
property and house

$104,817 (R. 838)

Out-of-pocket expenses1

$

3,198 (R. 839)

Bankruptcy costs

$

3,139 (R. 839)

Lost income of Larry Crookston
due to inability to work as
part-time janitor (1982-84)

$ 31,798 (R. 839-841)

Identified as consisting of "monies that [plaintiffs] have personally expended in connection with construction on the site, building permits, and taxes,
utilities, insurance premiums . . . sweat equity . . . and loan fees." (R. 839)

3

Lost income of Larry Crookston
due to failure to obtain nursing
degree (1984 - time of trial)

$ 72,251 (R. 842-844)

Future loss of income of Larry
Crookston due to impairment of
income in his nursing profession
(time of trial - 1990)

$ 83,306 (R. 845)

Lost past fringe benefits of
Larry Crookston

$ 11,560 (R. 847-848)

Future loss of fringe benefits
of Larry Crookston

$ 13,300 (R. 848)
$323, 3992

Total

During his testimony, Dr. Randle also testified that it was
impossible for him to render a precise expert opinion as to any
hard economic injury allegedly sustained by plaintiffs attributable
to their having to file bankruptcy.

Dr. Randle testified as

follows:
Q.

Have you attempted to calculate this type
of economic loss which could be suffered
by the Crookstons, the type that you have
described . . . ?

A.

I have not.

Q.

Can you do that?

A.

I don't think I can. I guess it might be
possible, but I have two questions that I
just don't have the kind of crystal ball
that allows me to gaze into this aspect
of their lives and put a dollar value on
it. It's too speculative for me. (R.
858-859)

During the initial appeal brought by defendant, this Court
affirmed the trial jury's verdict and the trial court's refusal to
2

Those damage figures relating to past economic damages as of the time of trial included 10% interest from the time of the alleged damage, some
of which was sustained in 1982, until the time of trial in 1987.

4

grant a new trial or remittitur on the issue of the compensatory
damages.

The original jury verdict was for $815,82 6 in compen-

satory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages.

(R. 1543-46)

In reviewing the trial testimony on the issue of

compensatory

damages, this Court stated:
[T]estimony at trial attributed $323,399 of
the $815,826 [in compensatory damages awarded
at trial] to economic loss, making the
remaining $492,427 apparently attributable to
emotional distress and loss of financial
reputation.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 795.

The Court also noted that the trial

court had entered an additional judgment against defendant awarding
plaintiffs attorney fees of $175,000 and expenses of $11,126.

Id.

The Court, however, vacated the trial court's denial of defendant's
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur on the issue of punitive damages
and remanded the action back to the trial court for reconsideration
consistent with the Court's opinion in Crookston.
Following the issuance of this Court's opinion in Crookston on
June 28, 1991, defendant, on July 22, 1991, tendered two cashier's
checks totaling $1,489,263.14 to plaintiffs and their counsel.
Said sum was paid in full and complete satisfaction of plaintiffs'
judgments

for compensatory

against defendant.
tiffs'

judgments

damage award.

damages, attorney's

fees

and

costs

As a result, all that remains unpaid of plainagainst

defendant

is the

$4,000,000

punitive

(R. 3044-3045)

On remand, the parties attempted to negotiate a potential
settlement of the punitive damage award, but having failed to do so

5

went forward on defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur,
Following oral argument on the motion on January 31, 1992, the
trial court issued a 23-page Memorandum Decision on February 10,
1992, setting forth the reasons for its denial of defendant's
motion.

(R.

proposed

order

3197-3219)
and

Plaintiffs' counsel

submitted

then prepared

a

the same to defendant's counsel.

Defendant's counsel timely objected to the form of the proposed
order.

(R. 3222-3226)

Over the objection of defendant, the trial

court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative
Remittitur on March 25, 1992.

(R. 3238-3242)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case involves an unprecedented award of $4.0 million in
punitive damages.

The initial jury verdict was rendered with

"essentially standardless discretion."

This Court in the first

appeal of this case, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P. 2d
789 (Utah 1991), crafted a new standard for ensuring that punitive
awards bear a reasonable and rational relationship to other damages
awarded

in a case.

The sheer size ana disparate

relationship

between the punitive award and the compensatory damages in this
case demonstrate that the original jury was influenced by passion
and prejudice.

The interests of justice and fair play require that

a new jury utilizing the Crookston standards be allowed to pass on
the issue of punitive damages.
In determining whether the jury's punitive award was unduly
excessive, this Court has traditionally reviewed verdicts in light
6

of several evidentiary factors.

Application of the traditional

"list of factors" and the standards set forth in Crookston require
a reduction in the punitive damage award in this case.
The trial court further committed error in considering on
remand numerous facts and inferences not properly before the court.
The trial court erred in considering numerous facts which were
never introduced into evidence before the original jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO PERMIT A NEW JURY TO REASSESS THE
PUNITIVE DAMAGE ISSUE UNDER THE STANDARDS
ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT IN CROOKSTON.
A.

The Original Verdict Was Rendered Under Pre-Crookston
Standards

This Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789
(Utah

1991),

acknowledges

that the unprecedented

$4.0 million

punitive damage award in this case clearly "exceeds the general
pattern"

established

in prior

Utah

cases.

Id.

at

807.

In

Crookston, the Court also notes the numerous problems which are
created

by

giving

finders

of

fact

discretion" to award punitive damages.
jury verdict rendered

"essentially

standardless

Id. at 809.

The original

in this case was the product of such a

"standardless" standard.
In vacating the trial court's order denying defendant's Motion
for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court observed at least the
following deficiencies in the punitive damage "standard" utilized
by the jury in this case:
7

"[A] review of our case law in punitive damages has
left us dissatisfied with articulated standards for
determining the amount of such awards."
Xd. at
808.
"These standards provide little guidance for . . .
a jury fixing the punitive damages . . .." Id.
"The stated list of factors we have said must be
considered in assessing the amount of punitives to
be awarded include the following . . . .
Our cases
have done little more than list these factors. No
relative weights have been assigned them, and no
standards or formulas have been established for
properly evaluating them when making an award or
when reviewing the propensity of a jury award.
This makes such an enterprise highly problematic
for judge and jury.
The finder of fact has no
guidance on how much weight to give each factor or
even how the factors should be assessed.
And
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial court
that there is any sort of limit or ceiling on an
award." Id.
"[Q]uite predictably, the bases for awards made in
those jurisdictions [utilizing similar "list of
factors" tests to fix punitive awards] are no more
fathomable than ours.
The problem that results
from this lack of guidance to juries . . .
is
exemplified by disparate ratios of punitive to
actual damages . . .." Id.
"[T]he standard by which the jury is to gauge the
amount of punitive damages, if any, that it is to
award is incomprehensibly vague and unintelligible
. . . . Under such a * standard,' one jury can award
^21,130.86 and another $2,490,000 for the same
wrong./fl Id. at 809 (quoting Charter Hospital of
Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So.2d 909, 916-17
(Ala. 1990).
"Many states have recognized the problems created
by giving finders of fact essentially standardless
discretion to award punitive damages . . .." Id.
The

above-noted

deficiencies

which

standards for assessing punitive damages

were

inherent

in

the

in the State of Utah

before Crookston compelled this court to "craft" a new set of

8

guidelines for awarding punitive damages. Id* at 808. In adopting
such guidelines, the court adopted a "middle ground" approach,
rather than continuing to rely solely on the traditional "list-offactors standard" used in 1987 when the Crookston jury rendered its
verdict.
B.

Id. at 809.
The Crookston "Reasonable and Rational" Relationship
Requirement.

The new standard mandated by this Court's opinion in Crookston
places additional emphasis or clarification on the requirement that
there be a "reasonable

and

rational" relationship

between a

punitive damage award and the actual compensatory damages awarded
by a jury.

Id. at 810-11.

This Court in Crookston further

articulates the following general standard to enable juries, trial
courts, and appellate courts to know what is mandated under the
"reasonable and rational relationship" requirement:
Generally, we have found punitive damage
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive only
when the punitives do not exceed actual
damages by more than a ratio of approximately
3-to-l. (Citations omitted)
Because of the limited number of cases
considering large awards, it is more difficult
to note a particular pattern once the award
exceeds approximately $100,000. However, it
is safe to say that these large awards appear
to receive more scrutiny than the smaller
awards and that the acceptable ratio appears
lower. (Citations omitted)
The general rule to be drawn from our past
cases appears to be that where the punitives
are well below $100,000, punitive damage
awards beyond a 3-to-l ratio to actual damages
have seldom been upheld and that where the
award is in excess of $100,000, we have

9

indicated some inclination to overturn awards
having ratios of less than 3-to-l.
Id. at 810 (emphasis added)
C.

Justice Requires That A New Jury Fix The Punitive Award
With The Crookston Standards.

This Court in Crookston did not clearly state what type of
procedure the parties were entitled to in order to

facilitate

"further consideration11 of the punitive damage award in this case.
Defendant requested that the trial court permit defendant to retry
the issue of punitive damages to a new jury utilizing the Crookston
standards.

While

the

Federal

or

State

Constitution

do

not

apparently require the retroactive application of the Crookston
opinion, notions of fair play and justice suggest strongly that a
new

jury

should

have been permitted

to pass on the

punitive damages utilizing the Crookston standards.

issue of

Even though

courts are afforded discretion in determining whether to apply
overruling decisions retroactively to pending actions, Loyal Order
of Moose No. 2 59 v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982), this
Court has also acknowledged that "ordinarily an overruling decision
has retroactive operation.11

Id. at 264.

This Court is once again confronted with a challenge to an
excessive

punitive

damage

award

rendered

"essentially standardless discretion."
attempted

by

a

jury

utilizing

On remand, Judge Frederick

to utilize the standards contained

in the

Crookston

opinion to review an "essentially standardless" punitive award.
Such a procedure which allowed the original trier of fact to use
one formula, albeit of dubious assistance and guidance, to render
10

a $4.0 million punitive award, and then permitted Judge Frederick
to use a new standard to review and pass upon the appropriateness
of the initial award is fundamentally flawed.

Such a procedure

effectively infringes upon the rights to procedural fairness, due
process, and trial by jury.

The only procedure which would protect

the interests of justice and fair play would be for a new jury to
pass on the issue of punitive damages utilizing the Crookston
standards.3
POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO
REMIT THE $4.0 MILLION PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN
CROOKSTON.
This

Court

in Crookston

outlined

the

standards

by

which

punitive awards should be reviewed by trial and appellate courts to
ensure due process and fairness for all parties involved.

The

reviewing court is to first determine whether punitive damages "are
appropriate at all."

Id. at 808.

This Court has already found

that the requisite mental state for an award of punitive damages
was properly decided by the jury.
post-verdict

review

excessive."

Id.

is

"whether

Id.
the

The second inquiry in the
amount

of

punitives

is

In determining the issue of excessiveness, a

reviewing court is required to determine whether the award is
excessive in light of the traditional "list of factors" standards:
[T]he amount of the actual damages awarded, the
nature of the wrongdoer's acts, the facts and

On remand, defendant submitted to the trial court proposed jury instructions which incorporated the new standard set forth in Crookston. (R.
3189-90)

11

circumstances surrounding the wrongful acts, the
relative wealth of the wrongdoer, the probability
the wrongdoer might act in the same way in the
future, the relationship between the parties, and
the effect of the misconduct on the lives of the
victims and others.
Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985).

In reviewing

the excessiveness of a punitive award, this Court in Crookston
further required that the punitive damages bear a "rational and
reasonable" relationship to the compensatory damages awarded.

In

so doing, the Court set certain presumptive ratios. Crookston, 817
P. 2d at 808. Analysis and application of the "list of factors" and
the Crookston presumptive ratios to the present case demonstrate
the excessive nature of the punitive damage award in this case.
1.
At

Amount of Actual Damages Awarded.
trial

plaintiffs

introduced

sustained $323,399 in "hard" damages.4

evidence

that

they

had

The remaining $492,427 of

the compensatory award apparently was based on the plaintiffs'
emotional distress and loss of financial reputation.
are characterized as "soft" damages.

Such damages

In Crookston, this court

noted that one of the factors that may justify a remittitur is "the
fact that a substantial portion of the actual damages is "soft,"
thus making the ratio analysis suspect. Id. at 811. In this case,
plaintiffs' damages, including prejudgment interest, were roughly
60% "soft" and 40% "hard".
"soft" damages were "real."

Defendant does not dispute that those
The critical issue is whether such

It is important to also note that the "hard" damages awarded to plaintiffs by the jury were based upon the computations of Dr. Paul Randle.
Dr. Randle inflated the "hard" damages at the time of trial by including 10% prejudgment interest in his calculations. As a result, the actual "hard" damages
sustained by the plaintiffs were considerably less than the $323,399 testified to by Dr. Randle.

12

"soft"

damages

should

be

taken

into

account

in

applying

the

Crookston ratio standards. While general damages, such as for pain
and suffering, are "real," they are considered "soft" because there
is no ascertainable, tangible barometer or measurement by which
they can be fixed with any mathematical basis or accuracy.

On the

other hand, "hard" damages, i.e., actual out-of-pocket damacfes, can
be ascertained with mathematical precision, as Dr. Randle did in
this case, opining that the "hard" damages consisted of exactly
$323,399.
Since more than 60% of the jury's compensatory damage award in
this case consists of

"soft" damages, it would

be unfair and

improper for this Court to apply the Crookston ratio standard to
the entire compensatory award of $815,82 6.

As the case currently

stands, the $4.0 million punitive award bears more than a 4.9 to 1
relationship to the compensatory damage award.

However, if only

"soft" damages are considered in applying the Crookston ratio, the
punitive award bears an approximately 12.4 to 1 ratio to the "soft"
damages.

Under either view, the punitive damage award grossly

exceeds the ratios suggested by Crookston.
While this Court in Crookston suggested strongly that the
trial court should take into account the distinction between "hard"
and

"soft" damages when determining

punitive

damages,

distinction.
lengths

to

the

trial

court

Xd. at 811, n. 29.
which

the

trial

the appropriate
refused

to

amount of

make

such

a

It is interesting to note the

court

went

to

try

to

make

the

plaintiffs' damages fall within the Crookston presumptive ratio
13

standards.

In the Memorandum Decision of February 10, 1992, the

trial court characterized its additional judgment of $175,000 in
attorney's

fees,

$151,330

in unawarded

fees, and

litigation expenses and costs as "actual damages".
trial

court

$1,153,282.

then

found

(R. 3214)

the

amount

of

actual

$11,126 in

(R. 3214) The
damages

to be

The trial court then must have taken some

consolation that its calculations now resulted in a punitive damage
award falling within the presumptive ratio, stating, "when compared
to the punitive damage sum awarded of $4,000,000, the ratio is
approximately 2.88 to 1."

(R. 3214)

mathematics were in error.

However, the trial court's

Even assuming actual damages of

$1,153,282, the ratio of punitive damages to the trial court's view
of "actual damages" still resulted in a ratio of approximately 3.47
to 1.

Thus, not even the trial court could find a way to inflate

the damages in this case to fall within the presumptive ratio
standard.
In determining the excessiveness of the punitive damages in
this case, this Court should also take into account the sheer size
of the extremely large award of "soft" damages, totaling nearly
one-half million dollars in this case.

In Cruz v. Montova, 660

P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), this Court remitted an award of punitive
damages in part because "the jury was generous in its award of
general damages."

Id. at 727.

In Cruz, the plaintiff was beaten

in a physical altercation with the defendant.

The jury awarded

$9,000 in general damages, $579.89 in special damages, and $12,000
in punitive damages.

Although the court found that $9,000 in
14

general damages was not excessive, the court felt that the jury's
generosity in awarding general damages necessitated a 50% reduction
in the award of punitive damages.

Id.

The unprecedented award of $4.0 million in punitive damages
when considered alongside the significant award of compensatory
damages demand a remittitur of the punitive damage award in this
case.

In Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 62, 267 P.2d 759 (1954), this

Court in reducing an award of punitive damages in a case involving
"a very substantial judgment for compensatory damages," recognized
the unique position that this Court must play in reviewing punitive
damage awards:
Punitive damages are awarded on the theory
that it is permissible in case of certain
aggravated wrongs to permit the private
litigant, in the public interest, to impose a
penalty upon the defendant as a punishment and
to deter others from engaging in similar
offenses.
The reasons why the jury and the
trial judge are particularly advantaged to fix
compensatory damages are much less cogent
here. For this reason we feel more at liberty
to review and modify the award as to punitive
damages.
Wilson, 267 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added).
If left unremitted, the jury's punitive damage award in this
case would not only grossly exceed the Crookston ratio standard,
but would also amount to a penalty of nearly two and one-half
months of defendant's net income in 1986.

Such an award has been

found in other jurisdictions to be clearly excessive.

See Egan v.

.Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 620
P. 2d 141, (1979) (Award of $5.0 million in punitive damages against
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insurer was excessive as a matter of law where it represented two
and one-half months of insurer's entire net income in one year).
2.

The Nature of the Wrongdoer's Acts.

This Court has affirmed the jury's finding that defendant
committed fraud upon plaintiffs.

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800. In

reviewing the published cases involving punitive awards in cases of
fraud, defendant has been unable to locate a Utah case where a jury
has rendered a punitive damage award even approaching $4.0 million.
While defendant acknowledges the jury's verdict against defendant
has been affirmed by this Court, the record still does not contain
any direct evidence that defendant's employees acted out of vindictiveness or ill will towards plaintiffs.
evidence was to the contrary.

In fact, the direct

(R. 1952-53, 2295)

There were many extenuating circumstances in this case, the
uniqueness of the loss itself, the inability of the parties to
promptly obtain bids on the loss, and the repeated and insistent
demands by the bank for payment under the policy.

While such

factors do not excuse defendant's conduct, such factors explain why
this claim went awry. Plaintiffs were successful in convincing the
jury that they had sustained real and significant injuries as a
result of defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs were likewise successful
in maintaining

that

the

antisocial but outrageous.

conduct

of

defendant

was

not only

However, it can scarcely be said that

the facts of this case are significantly worse than any other
reported case in the State of Utah.

Even a casual review of the

case law of this state discloses equally deplorable conduct being
16

punished and deterred by much less severe awards of punitive
damages.
In Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), a $500,000
punitive damage award was affirmed against an individual who was
found liable for defrauding an 82-year old man out of his ranch.
The plaintiff had spent nearly 4 0 years building up his ranch at
the time of the defendant's fraudulent acts.

The defendant

fraudulently obtained the ranch for approximately

10% of its

conservatively assessed valuation of more than one million dollars
by

ingratiating himself

with plaintiff, and by making

false

statements which led plaintiff to believe that the defendant was
going to "save" plaintiff's ranch from a foreclosure sale.

Von

Hake represents the highest punitive damage award affirmed by this
Court.
While defendant's conduct has been found to have been wrongful, the facts of this case do not warrant a punitive damage award
of $4.0 million, eight times the size of the next highest award
affirmed on appeal in Von Hake.
3.

Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Defendant's Misconduct.

This case arises from a situation where defendant owed duties
to both plaintiffs and Rocky Mountain State Bank for the adjustment
of the loss.
unique.

The circumstances surrounding this loss were highly

The potential for delay, mistake, and errors of judgment

were significant.

While plaintiff maintained that defendant's

employees acted with ill will, malice and total indifference toward
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the Crookstons, the finding of malice upon which the jury based its
punitive damage award was based upon circumstantial evidence.
witness at the trial testified

that defendant's

actual malice towards plaintiffs.

No

employees had

Where there is only circum-

stantial evidence of malice, a large and unprecedent award of
punitive damages is unsupportable.

In First Security Bank of Utah

v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. , 653 P. 2d 791 (Utah 1982), this Court
noted that an award of $100,000 was unsupportable where there was
no direct evidence of the defendant's actual malice:
In this case, the finding of actual malice on which
the lower court based its punitive damages award
was not derived from direct evidence concerning the
state of mind of plaintiff's officers, but rather
was inferred from plaintiff's wrongful actions.
Such evidence, while sufficient to sustain the
finding of the trial court, does not show a vindictiveness or ill will so extreme as to warrant the
vast sum awarded here, which is many times greater
than the punitive damages awards in any of the
cases cited by intervenor. The trial court's award
of $100,000, considered in light of the actual harm
suffered by the intervenor, the degree of malice
shown by plaintiff and the other factors listed
abovee appears to this Court so excessive as to
indicate that it was "arrived at by passion or
prejud;ce"
in violation
of the
above-quoted
standee ds. Under these circumstances, this Court
must i ?.duce the award to an amount which the
evidence, viewed most favorably to intervenor, can
justify. We direct the trial court to modify its
judgment to provide for punitive damages award of
$50,000.
Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
4.

Defendant's Relative Wealth.

In determining whether the size of the punitive damage award
in this case itself suggests a jury verdict motivated by passion
and prejudice, this Court should pay particular attention to the
18

effect of having defendant's wealth injected into the case before
liability had even been determined.
permitted under Utah law.
1992).

Such a procedure is no longer

See Utah Code Ann,, § 78-18-1(2) (Supp.

The likelihood that evidence of a party's significant

wealth might create undue prejudice and lead to excessive verdicts
has been recognized by many courts.

In City of Newport v. Fact

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court noted:
Because evidence of a tort-feasor's wealth is
traditionally admissible as a measure of the amount
of punitive damages that should be awarded, the
unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a
prejudicial impact on the jury, in effect
encouraging it to impose a sizable award.
The
impact of such a windfall recovery is likely to be
both unpredictable and, at times, substantial
The prejudicial impact of allowing evidence of an insurance
company's

wealth

to

go

to

the

jury

before

liability

compensatory damages is determined is likewise apparent.

for
One

commentator has stated:
It is probable that this very evidence, instead of
aiding the jury to assess a proper verdict, may
prejudice them against the defendant and prevent an
impartial judgment, not only on the size of the
verdict, but in deciding who shall win the case.
It is a good guess that rich men do not fare well
before juries, and the more emphasis played on
their riches the less well they fare.
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1191
(1931).

See also, Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming

Punitive Damages, 69 Va. L. Rev., 269, 285, 291 (1983).
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It has long been established that justice should not depend
upon a party's wealth or status.
defendant's

wealth

created

a

The introduction of evidence of
significant

likelihood

that an

unprecedented award of punitive damages would be rendered in this
case.

The real potential for the jury to have misused evidence of

defendant's wealth is further justification for this Court to remit
the punitive award in this case.
Plaintiffs also successfully argued in the court below that
public policy considerations of punishment and deterrence would
only be served by an outright reaffirmation of the jury's $4.0
million punitive damage award.
Court's

pronouncement

that

an

While defendant accepts this
award

of

punitive

damages

is

appropriate in this case, defendant respectfully submits that an
award of $4.0 million is not required to effect the public policy
concerns of deterrence and punishment. Plaintiffs' allegation that
defendant has not yet been punished for its conduct ignores the
reality of what has transpired since the day plaintiffs' home
collapsed in 1982.

Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Paul Randle,

testified that this case arose from an underpayment of approximately $21,612 on plaintiff's loss.

(R. 2458)

Defendant has

already been required to pay $1,489,2 63.14 in damages, fees and
costs to plaintiffs. This represents nearly seventy (70) times the
amount of the underpayment.

Such costs do not even include the

internal and external costs and fees incurred by defendant during
the pendency of this case and the two appeals.

If there is a

lesson to be learned by defendant in this case, it can scarcely be
20

argued that paying nearly $1.5 million in compensatory damages as
a result of a $21,612 underpayment would not teach that lesson and
serve as a effective deterrent and punishment to defendant.
5.

Probability of Future Reoccurrence of Misconduct.

Plaintiffs have asserted below that there is a tremendous
potential and incentive for defendant's employees to engage in
repeated misconduct in the future unless defendant is severely
punished in this case. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates that
there was no evidence introduced at trial suggesting that defendant
would more than likely conduct itself in the same way in the
future.

Plaintiffs further ignore that the insurance industry is

highly competitive and that competitiveness in the marketplace
depends on the efficiency and thoroughness of service, not on
insurance company mottos or slogan.
its ability

to compete

Defendant would surely lose

in the marketplace

if

its employees

continued to engage in systematic fraud and bad faith, as suggested
by plaintiff to the trial court.

Such speculative and baseless

assertions tend only to engender passion and prejudice and invite
this court to abandon common sense and reason.
The probability

of future reoccurrence of misconduct is

further lessened by the uniqueness of the circumstances surrounding
this

case.

Plaintiff's

home was an earth home

of unusual

construction. The collapse and ensuing damage to plaintiffs' earth
home were not ordinary events with which defendant or any other
entity

or

individual,

including

plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs' loss was one of a kind.
21

were

familiar.

No one quite knew how to

handle the lossf not out of spite or ill will for plaintiffs, but
due to the uniqueness of the loss.
plaintiffs' loss, many qualified

Due to the unique nature of
contractors refused

to even

consider making a bid on the repair of plaintiffs' home.

(R.

1687-88, 1976-77, 2035, 2557)
In the court below, plaintiffs maintained that defendant's
alleged failure to admit wrongdoing or to punish the employees who
handled plaintiffs' claim are evidence of a cold, calculated and
callous attitude likely to result in future misconduct. Plaintiffs
urge that defendant's failure to demonstrate a penitent attitude
suggests the likelihood that defendant will continue engaging in
alleged wrongdoings on other unsuspecting policyholders in the
future.

The demand that defendant destroy the careers of its

employees and interrupt the lives of their family members due to
alleged mistakes made in the handling

of a single claim is

unwarranted and mean spirited. The uniqueness of the circumstances
presented in this case demonstrate a low probability that defendant
will

engage

in similar

conduct

in the

circumstances, a remittitur is warranted.

future.

Under

such

See Bundy v. Century

Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984).
6.

Relationship Between the Parties.

In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 789, 795
(1960), this Court stated:
Where there is a wrong involving the violation of a
duty springing from a relation of trust or
confidence, and the wrong is of a gross and
aggravated nature, the malicious conduct necessary
to justify punitive damages may be found.
22

In this case, the controversy between plaintiffs and defendant
arose in the context of a first-party insurance contract.

This

Court has recognized that no relationship of trust or reliance is
created by an insurance contract.
701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,

Furthermore, practically speaking,

an insurer and its insured are adversaries.

Lyon v. Hartford

Accid. & Indemn. Co. . 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745 (1971),
overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (1985).

Since there

were no breaches of fiduciary duties in this case, the staggering
award of punitive damages is further unsupportable.
7.

Effect of the Misconduct on the Lives of the Victims and
Others,

In denying defendant's Motion for New or Remittitur, the trial
court

has

found

that

defendant's

wrongdoing

"had

devastating

effects upon the Crookstons and to a lesser degree, many other
innocent parties."

(R. 3239)

Defendant does not dispute that the

jury found that the Crookstons were harmed by defendant's conduct.
While

a

significant

amount

of

evidence

was

adduced

at

trial

establishing the emotional difficulties suffered by the plaintiffs
following the settlement between defendant and Rocky Mountain State
Bank, the quality of the evidence introduced to the jury concerning
plaintiffs' emotional distress does not support the unprecedented
award of punitive damages here.
This Court has already suggested that the verdict on the
compensatory award was "admittedly liberal."
at 807, n. 22.

Crookston, 817 P.2d

The record establishes that plaintiffs were upset
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and distraught over defendant's conduct.
not

a

single

scintilla

of

medical

Nevertheless, there was

testimony

to

support

or

substantiate the nature or extent of their emotional distress. The
frustrations, aggravations, and traumas sustained by plaintiffs
were unfortunate and serious.
have

been

fully

compensated

compensatory award.

Plaintiffs' emotional difficulties
for

by

an

admittedly

"liberal"

It should not be forgotten that the plain-

tiffs' emotional state was in part due to the mere fact that their
"dream home" had collapsed.

(R. 2209-10)

As Mr. Crookston

testified at trial, the collapse of the home was the most significant emotional trauma ever sustained by him or his family.

(Id.)

The evidence of plaintiffs' emotional distress, however, was
qualitatively deficient to support a punitive damage award eight
times the next highest reported punitive damage award in this
state.5
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY CONSIDERING
FACTS AND INFERENCES NOT SUPPORTED IN THE
TRIAL RECORD.
On remand, the trial court permitted the parties to submit
memoranda and oral argument on defendant's Motion for New Trial or
Remittitur.

Plaintiffs'

memorandum

in

opposition

contained

numerous facts and inferences which were not properly before the
trial court, including assertions that since the time of trial the

This Court should also contrast the punitive damage award and plaintiffs' emotional distress in this case with the facts in Elkington v. Foust,
618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (Court affirmed a punitive damage award of $30,000 where there was expert medical testimony of permanent psychological damage
resulting from seven years of prolonged sexual assault and abuse, including sexual intercourse, between a minor and her step-father).
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plaintiffs had remained homeless, that plaintiffs had been unable
to obtain credit, that plaintiffs' creditors had never been paid,
and that defendant had never admitted wrongdoing or "voluntarily
take

any

action

perpetrators•"

to

rectify

the

wrongs"

or

"reprimand

the

(R. 3125-3126) Plaintiffs' counsel also attempted

to engender passion and prejudice in the trial judge by attempting
to inject the wealth of other members of the Farmers Insurance
Group of Companies into the proceedings.

(R. 3273-74)

Frederick

February

in his Memorandum

Decision

of

Judge

10, 1992,

incorporated many of those same facts and inferences into his
ruling,

(R. 3197-2219)

It is patently unfair for a trial court, charged with the duty
to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented to a jury, to
entertain and adopt facts and inferences never presented to the
jury in the first instance.

Defendant respectfully submits that

the trial court's consideration and adoption of such prejudicial
factors outside the trial record were improper and unduly tainted
the trial court's ruling in this case.
The trial court's Order denying defendant's Motion for New
Trial or Remittitur is further deficient to the extent that it
contains findings of fact and conclusions of law which were not
supported in the trial record by competent testimony.

Paragraph 3

of the trial court's Order contains the following language not
supported in the record:
The wrongdoing of this case was motivated by
financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million
dollar corporation which appears to have a
25

prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous
behavior for financial gain, a significant punitive
award is required . . •.
(R. 3240)
Likewise, paragraph 4 of the Order contains the following
language not supported in the record:
This court concludes that the most effective means
of punishing and deterring the defendant in this
case is through a significant punitive damage
award. Insurance companies are generally regulated
by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah.
This case illustrates the lack of deterrent effect
of the* Insurance Department.
(R. 3240)
Paragraph 6 of the Order also contains the following language
not supported in the record:
Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has
the capacity and expertise to calculate in advance
its exposure to liability and spread the cost
thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect of
punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling.
In this case the relative importance of the
presumptive ratio should therefore be less.
(R. 3241)
The consideration of such facts and the conclusions of law
drawn therefrom by the trial demonstrate the need for this matter
to be either remanded for a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages or for this Court to order an appropriate remittitur.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Fire Insurance Exchange
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the trial court's
denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and remand
the action back to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of
26

punitive damages or in the alternative that this Court remit the
unprecedented award of $4.0 million in punitive damages against
this defendant based upon the record presented to the jury.
Dated this

»

day of July, 1992.
STRONG & HANNI

Stephen J. Trayner
Attorm&ys for DefendantAppellant
103679bc
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ADDENDUM

1.

Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P.

2.

Memorandum Decision, February 10, 1992

3.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial or in
the Alternative Remittitur, March 25, 1992
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RULE 59(A), U.R.C.P.

Rule 59.

New trials; amendments of judgment.

(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial,
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

MEMORANDUM DECISION, FEBRUARY 10, 1992

:c?
* 10 H 2
FED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CR-83-1030

vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

Defendant
Insurance") has

Fire

Insurance

filed

a Motion

Exchange

(hereinafter

for New Trial

"Fire

or Remittitur,

with supporting Memoranda; plaintiffs have responded by filing
a Memorandum in opposition.
failed

efforts

to

settle

These pleadings were filed after

the

controversy

conducted

by

this

Court on October 7, 1991.
This matter was tried with a jury for six days, commencing
on the 26th day of May, 1987.
Insurance's

initial

Motion

After denial of defendant Fire

for New

Trial

or Remittitur,

the

Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (June 28, 1991), affirmed the
jury verdict, but remanded the matter for further determination
by this Court as to whether or not the punitive damage award

CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE

was

appropriate

respective

and/or

Memoranda,

PAGE 2

excessive.

counsel

MEMORANDUM DECISION

After

presented

submission

of

argument

in

oral

support of their respective positions on January

31, 1992.

This Court having now reviewed the Memoranda, the Supreme Court
decision, the file materials, the transcript, its own notes of
the trial, and heard oral argument, is prepared to rule.

OPINION
At trial, plaintiffs7 expert economist, Dr. Paul Randall,
testified incident to the claim of economic damages sustained
by the plaintiffs as a result of conduct alleged to have been
inappropriate by the defendant Fire Insurance.

He testified

that those economic losses amounted to $323,399.00.

The jury

awarded the sum of $815,826.00 total compensatory damages.

The

Supreme

the

Court

has

opined

that

the

difference

between

economic losses and the total amount of compensatory damages
awarded, namely, $492,427.00 was "apparently attributable to
emotional

distress

and

loss

of

financial

reputation."

In

addition, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$4,000,000.00.

This

Court,

subsequent

to

trial

awarded

$175,000.00 attorney's fees to plaintiffs, as well as their
costs incurred of $11,12 6.00.

Fire Insurance seeks, pursuant

C'.'ttSS
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59(a)(5), a remittitur
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of the punitive damages of

$4,000,000.00, or alternatively a new trial.
A Motion for a New Trial as presented, on the issue of
punitive

damages

requires

of

the

trial

court

a

two-prong

inquiry:

(1) whether punitives are appropriate at all; and (2)

whether the amount of punitives is excessive, appearing to have
been

given

under

influence

of

passion

or

prejudice.

The

responsibility of the trial court is to review the. amount of
the award to insure that the jury has acted within proper
bounds.

This is so because the trial judge is present during

all aspects of the trial and listens to and views all witnesses
and is in an advantaged position to determine if the jury acted
with passion or prejudice.

To grant a new trial, the trial

court must conclude that the jury erred, not merely because it
disagrees with the jury's judgment.

The trial court, if it is

inclined to grant a new trial or remittitur, should indicate
wherein there was plain disregard of the instructions of the
Court or the evidence, or what constituted passion or prejudice.
If the trial court reasonably concludes the jury acted with
passion or prejudice contrary to Rule 59(a)(5) it may grant a
new trial.

O.'ttSS
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award

of
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compensatory
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damages

in

the

amount

of

$323,339.00 for economic loss, and $492,427.00 for emotional
and mental distress, and loss of financial reputation, for a
total of $815,826.00, was upheld by the Supreme Court, as was
the award of attorney's fees of $175,000.00, and expenses of
$11,126.00.

These sums this Court is advised were paid after

the decision by the Utah Supreme Court.
In this case, the jury clearly concluded as did this Court,
that the requisite mental state required to support an award of
punitive damages was present, which finding was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Punitive dcimages are designed
future, egregious conduct.
according
general

to

the

pattern

Supreme
set

by

to punish past and deter

Here, the award of $4,000,000.00
Court

prior

exceeds

Supreme

the

Court

bounds

of the

decisions.

In

deciding, therefore, whether the award is or is not excessive,
notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds the pattern of awards
previously upheld, seven factors are to be considered.
are

the

same

seven

factors

considered

by

the

Instruction No. 33) in arriving at its verdict.

These

jury

(in

This Court

will address each, in a somewhat different order, commencing
with the facts and circumstances surrounding Fire Insurance's
misconduct.

03200
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FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING FIRE
INSURANCE'S MISCONDUCT

The most flagrant conduct of Fire Insurance centered around
intentional

fraud

of

its agents.

By April

15, 1982, Fire

Insurance, for the loss plaintiffs7 sustained in December of
1981,

had

$50,951.00;

obtained
the

bids

other

from

for

two

contractors:

$49,600.00;

and

had

authority to settle the claim for $49,443.00.

Fire

Denton Mosier,

Insurance

replaced

its

for

extended

In May, 1982,

the adjuster obtained another bid for $74,000.00.
thereafter,

one

initial

Immediately
adjuster,

with one "more experienced," Alan Clapperton.

Alan Clapperton, while in possession of the three bids ranging
from

$49,600.00 to

settle

for

fictitious

$74,000.00, and armed with authority to

$49,443.00, nevertheless,
bid

based

only

on

sought

a portion

and

of

the

obtained
loss,

a

for

$27,830.60, which was just slightly more than one-half of the
other bids received.

The evidence was undisputed that the bid

did not account for several items comprising the plaintiffs'
loss, and was based upon an engineering report which was not
intended to be the basis of a bid.

Clapperton knew the bid was

insufficient; he knew the Crookstons would object to the bid;
and moreover, he knew that the bank (loss payee) with whom he
had arranged to meet to negotiate settlement, would not settle
for such amount if the other bids were disclosed.
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In order to accomplish his scheme, Clapperton simply told
Ralph Klemm, counsel for the plaintiffs, on the very day he was
scheduled to meet with the bank, that he had no authority to
settle; concealed
without

disclosing

the existence
his

of the

intent

to

fictitious bid; and

Klemm,

conducted his negotiations with the bank.

surreptitiously

While meeting with

the bank, Clapperton did not disclose the fact that three other
bids, all substantially higher, had been obtained, nor did he
reveal that the fictitious bid of $27,830.60 was based on an
engineer's appraisal limited to structural damage only.
bank

officer

agreed

to

settle

for

slightly

more

The
than

$32,000.00, the amount of the "bid", plus an approximation of
the interest that had accrued on the Crookston loan since the
collapse.

Knowing

substantially

full

well

that

the

$27,83 0.60

lower than any other bid, Clapperton

bid

was

insisted

that the bank accept a settlement check made out only to the
bank, not jointly to the bank and the Crookstons, and that the
bank execute a proof of loss form releasing Fire Insurance from
any

further

liability

effected that same day.
when Clapperton

advised

on

the

claim.

The

settlement

was

The intentional fraud was completed
Klemm, when he discovered what had

transpired, that the Crookstons did not have to be included in
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the settlement, that nothing more was owing, and that he was
closing his file.
Clapperton admitted at trial that he knew that the bank
would pursue the Crookstons
$60,000.00

construction

settlement.

Clapperton

for a deficiency

loan

not

purposely

claim

on the

paid

by

the

insurance

sought

an

incomplete

and

unrealistic bid from an insider, Phipps; concealed the bid from
the Crookstons, lied to their attorney about the status of the
claim on the very day he negotiated with the bank; did not
disclose that he had any settlement authority; and deliberately
excluded

the

Crookstons

from

negotiations

with

the

bank.

Because the Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the loan,
the bank threatened foreclosure.

In order to avoid additional

interest, attorney's fees and costs, the Crookstons deeded the
property on which the home stood, to the bank in

lieu of

foreclosure, and then filed bankruptcy.
Clapperton left the Crookstons vulnerable to foreclosure
and bankruptcy knowing that would be the likely consequence of
his actions.
Clapperton7s

supervisor,

Kent

Soderquist,

had

previous

experience as a loan officer for a bank and was aware of the
bank's

foreclosure

rights

under

its

Deed

of

Trust.

Both
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Soderquist and Clapperton were well aware that if insurance
proceeds were not timely and adequately paid, the bank would
foreclose.

Furthermore, Fire Insurance through its agents had

actual knowledge that the bank was proceeding or intended to
proceed to foreclose on Crookstons' property.
evidence

of

Fire

Insurance's

intent

The most graphic
evidencing

total

indifference to the Crookstons' plight, can be seen from the
language of the letter, a trial exhibit, from Clapperton to
Frank Roybal, counsel for Fire Insurance, dated July 27, 1982,
at page 3, wherein Clapperton states as follows:
The bank has indicated that they intended to
proceed with foreclosure on the lot in order
to recoup the $18,000.00 they were still out
on the construction loan.... At this point,
we feel Farmers Insurance Group would have a
subrogation right against several of the
parties involved.
All

of

Fire

Insurance's

representatives

acknowledged

at

trial that the purpose of insurance was to prevent extreme
financial hardship and loss of property that would otherwise
occur, but for insurance.

Fire Insurance ratified and approved

all of the actions taken by its agents.

The regional office of

Fire Insurance and the district branch claims manager reviewed
the claims file routinely during all relevant times, and had
made various communications to the adjusters.
After the Crookstons filed a complaint with the Utah State
Insurance

Depeirtment,

the

regional

office

denied

any

CROOKSTON V, FIRE INSURANCE
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Incredibly

the

agents

of

Fire Insurance testified at trial that the practices which had
been

employed

Three

of

stated

Fire

that

fairly.

in

case

Insurance's

they

The

this

believed

claims

were

sound

employees
they

adjuster

had
who

who

business

practices.

testified

treated

the

committed

at

trial

Crookstons
the

fraud,

Clapperton, stated without any indication of remorse or regret,
that

he

"felt

good11

about

what

he

did

to

the

Crookstons.

Apparently, based upon his record of improving profits for Fire
Insurance, he was twice promoted since his dealings with the
Crookstons.

He is now the District Claims Manager supervising

the adjustment of all claims in northern Utah.

II.

THE RELATIVE WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT

At trial, evidence established that Fire insurance's total
assets in 1986, the year immediately prior to the date of the
trial, were $723,468,116.00; its total underwriting, investment
and

other

income

for

1986

was

$595,284,582.00; and

income for that one year was $23,000,000.00.

its

net

At the time of

the trial, the evidence disclosed that there were four claims
offices in Utah, each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year.
In addition, scores of other

offices

located

in the western

CROOKSTON V. FIRE INSURANCE
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number

of

claims.

Fire

Insurance is only one of approximately five insurance companies
doing business as Farmers Insurance Group.

Four of the five

Farmers companies use the same claims offices, management, and
presumably the same claims adjustment techniques as that of
Fire insurance,,

When compared to the total assets of Fire

Insurance only, for 1986, the punitive damage award amounts to
approximately one-half of one percent.

It goes without saying

that there is no rational comparison between Fire Insurance's
assets and income to that of plaintiffs: they were bankrupt.

III.
Milton

Beck,

NATURE OF THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT
an

insurance

adjuster

with

22

years

of

experience, and Dr. Paul Randall, a professor of finance, who
teaches

property

University,

and

casualty

persuasively

insurance

described

the

at

Utah

actions

of

State
Fire

Insurance as "blatantly outrageous" and "totally unacceptable",
outlining the following wrongful actions:
(a)

Excluding the Crookstons from settlement negotiations;

(b)

Relying on a bid which was almost one-half of other

bids.

Such a discrepancy would mean there was something

wrong with the low bid;

0.Q2G5
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(c)

Failing to disclose all other bids to the bank;

(d)

Improperly requiring the bank to sign a satisfaction

of claim and release without rebuilding the home;
(e)

Requiring the bank to sign a release and refusing to

deal with the Crookstons thereafter, leaving the Crookstons
personally exposed to further proceedings by the bank;
(f) Representing

that

the

Phipps

bid

($27,830.60)

was

adequate, and all that was owing under the policy, when
there

were

clearly

other

coverages

and

amounts

owing

thereunder;
(g)

Refusing to include the insureds7 name on a settlement

check in payment of a substantial amount of money;
(h)

Representing that engineer Rich's report (on which the

Phipps "bid" was obtained) was a complete analysis of the
damage when it was not;
(i) Using the Crookstons' failure to sign a proof of loss
form as grounds for denying their claims, particularly when
the Crookstons were not provided with such a form, and
adequate evidence of the loss had been provided to Fire
Insurance;
(j)

Rejecting the bids of Brewster, Stallings and Jones

(the three legitimate bids) because of insufficient detail,
without requesting the additional information and detail;

O'^fjf;
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Crookstons

that

Fire

rejecting the other bids and the reasons

therefore;
(1) Not

communicating

with

the

Crookstons

during

the

entire adjusting process;
(m)

Refusing

Crookstons

to
after

responsibility
complaint was

to

consider

additional

settling
the

with

insurance

claims

the

of

bank,

denying

commissioner

filed by the Crookstons, and

the

when

a

forcing the

Crookstons to bring legal action;
(n)

Refusing to clean up the collapse, even after the city

had given notice and threatened to condemn the property due
to the hazardous situation;
(o)

Delaying over six months while the Crookston home was

unfit for occupation, before making any attempts to settle;
(p) Maintaining a company policy that the only duty of an
adjuster

is to

protect

the

financial

interests

of the

insurance company and not the insured.

The

evidence

supporting

Fire

Insurance's

position

with

regard to the adjustment of the Crookstons7 claim and Fire
Insurance's apparent satisfaction with the manner in which its

0-3^07
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own insureds were treated represents both to this Court and
apparently to the jury, that

ill-will, malice and/or total

indifference to the Crookstons was its attitude.

Having sought

an inadequate bid, and having excluded the Crookstons from the
negotiations,

Fire

Insurance

settlement with the bank.
have

a

devastating

impact

was

in

total

control

of

the

Knowing that the settlement would
on

the

Crookstons,

Clapperton

nevertheless proceeded in a fraudulent, malicious fashion with
one goal in mind:
due

and

employer.

thereby

to cheat the plaintiffs out of their just
presumably

improve

his

standing

with

his

By their actions, the agents and representatives of

Fire Insurance demonstrated either actual malice and ill-will
toward the Crookstons and intended the consequence of their
actions, or Fire Insurance's agents acted wrongfully, solely to
further

their

own

financial

well-being,

despite

actual

knowledge of devastating harm to the Crookstons.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF DEFENDANTS MISCONDUCT ON THE LIVES
OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND OTHERS

The plaintiffs each testified at trial to the devatstating
effect the actions of Fire Insurance had on their personal

0^208
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They suffered serious emotional and nervous conditions,
were

testified

of

long-standing

to continued

through the trial
plaintiffs

were

from

nature,

and

the

the date of the

(approximately six years).
forced

to

file

devastation

loss,

at

least

In addition, the

bankruptcy

and

lost,

result, all of their savings and the lot they had

as

a

purchased

upon which to build their "dream home."
The loss to others involved the parents of the. plaintiffs
who had

loaned

their home.

them

some

$12,000.00

for the construction

of

They were not paid until after the Supreme Court

decision in this matter, in June 1991, some ten years after the
loss.

In addition, none of the Crookston bankruptcy creditors

were paid.
being

The bank, after settling with Fire Insurance and

required

property,

to

foreclose

nevertheless

$5,000.00.

and

sustained

repossess
a

loss

the
of

Crookstons'
approximately

Subcontractors who provided materials and labor to

the Crookstons' home were forced to file liens and commence a
suit against the Crookstons.

The general contractor was never

fully paid, and Fire Insurance failed to timely clean up the
debris from the collapse of the home, forcing the city where
the home was located to seek condemnation of the Crookstons'
property

because

of

the

hazardous

condition

it

created

neighborhood children.

Co209
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THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE RECURRENCE OF THE MISCONDUCT

Fire
wrongdoing

Insurance
since

has

the

maintained

beginning

a

of

stance

this

of

case.

denial
All

of

of the

witnesses for Fire Insurance testified they believed they had
treated the Crookstons fairly.
that

he

Clapperton

felt

good

has

been

about

Clapperton, moreover, testified

what

twice

he

did

promoted

to

since

the
the

Crookstons.
incident

in

question, and as indicated he is now District Claims Manager
for Northern Utah.
Denton Mosier, since his involvement in the matter, has
been made supervisor and testified that the handling of the
Crookstons' claim was done according to company policy, was
appropriate, and

was

handled

in

a

fashion

similar

to the

handling of other claims.
Mr. Soderquist, Clapperton's supervisor at the time of the
loss, described the claims adjusting philosophy of not just
Fire Insurance, but for all Farmers Insurance Group to indicate
that the adjuster's sole responsibility

is his duty to the

insurance

insurance

interests.

company:

to

protect

the

company's

And any efforts to assist the insureds in proving

their loss would be "beyond the scope of his actual duties as
an adjuster."

He testified the adjuster does not have a duty

0P210
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to protect the interests of the insureds, and technically the
adjuster

is

not

required

to

be

concerned

about

public

relations.
In

addition,

the

evidence

revealed

that

there

are

approximately four claims offices of Fire Insurance in Utah,
each handling 4,000 to 5,000 claims per year, and scores of
other such claims offices throughout the states which handle a
similar number of claims.

These claims offices adjust most, if

not all, claims of all members of the Farmers Insurance Group.
It is the view of this Court, that Fire Insurance's conduct
and lack of remorse incident thereto demonstrate a calculated
and calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and
this is in accord with what agents of Fire Insurance perceive
to be in keeping with their company policy.
From Fire Insurance's point of view, it certainly can be
argued

that

$4,000,000.00

punitive

damages

is

excessive.

However, from a public policy point of view, the award is
justified.

In the absence of punitive damages, Fire Insurance

may well find that it is profitable to continue its illegal
conduct, even though

it may

damages from time to time.

incur the cost of compensatory

One may never know how many of the

thousands of claims handled

in Utah

and

elsewhere by Fire

Op 211
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Insurance have been subjected to the same kind of fraudulent
manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses
to

those

who

contracted

in

good

faith.

A

$4,000,000.00

punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious effect in
inducing Fire Insurance to bring its practices into harmony
with common moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say
nothing of the requirements of the law.

VI.
The

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES

loss payee provision

in

favor of the bank

on the

insurance policy with Fire Insurance created a relationship
between the Crookstons and Fire Insurance of one in the nature
of

a

fiduciary

relationship.

In

a

third

party

insurance

situation, the insurer is a fiduciary of the insured.

The

insurer assumes responsibility for the insured and control over
the claims of third parties against the insured.

By contrast,

in first party situations, the insurer and the insured are
essentially

adversaries,

because

their

interests

concerning

payment under the policy are opposed.
The instant matter is somewhere between a first and third
party situation.

The insurer by its loss payee responsibility

assumed the position of standing

in for and protecting the
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PAGE 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

interests of the Crookstons from claims of the bank, the loss
payee.
the

If Fire Insurance did not have a legal duty to protect

interests

responsibility

of
to

the

Crookstons,

avoid

doing

harm

it

at

to

least

the

had

Crookstons

the
by

surreptitiously settling with the bank for sums admittedly much
less than the balance owing on the bank obligation; the policy
limits; and well below the amount of the legitimate bids known
to the defendant.

VII.
The actual

THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED
attorney's

fees paid by the Crookstons were

based upon a contingency fee of 40%. This Court, however, only
awarded $175,000.00 in fees, which was a little more than half
of the actual
litigation
Crookstons.
the words

fees paid

expenses

by the Crookstons.

constituted

an

The

actual

fees and

loss

to

the

In determining the ratio, the Supreme Court used
"actual damages."

Since the attorney's

fees and

litigation expenses were an "actual" damage sustained by the
Crookstons and were awarded by the Court, such figures should
be included in determining the ratio.
Canyon

Country

Store v.

This is consistent with

Bracey, 781 P.2d

414

(Utah

1989),

wherein the Supreme Court held that the actual contingent fee

0:^13
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was a consequential damage and should be awarded against the
insurer who acted in bad faith, stating at 420:
Canyon Country's claim for recovery of fees
was predicated on the theory that attorney
fees were an item of consequential damages
flowing
from
the
insurers7
breach
of
contract. This is a legitimate theory of
damages, as the trial court recognized.
Had Canyon Country been decided before the Crookston trial,
this Court would have awarded a 40% contingent fee .instead of
$175,000.00 in "reasonable11 fees actually awarded.
of

$151,3 3 0.00

as

unawarded

fees,

The deficit

constitutes

additional

"actual" loss to the Crookstons.
The

amount

$1,153,282.00
$151,330.00
costs).

of

actual

($815,826.00
attorneys

fees,

damages

incurred

compensatory,
and

amounts

$175,000.00

$11,126.00

expenses

to
and
and

When compared to the punitive damage sum awarded of

$4,000,000.00, the ratio is approximately 2.88 to 1.

There is

nothing in the Crookston opinion that would suggest that the
presumptive ratio is based on "hard" damages, rather than all
"actual" damages.

In fact, in the cases cited in Crookston

where "soft" damages were awarded, the ratio cited by the court
includes the "soft" damages.

The Supreme Court suggests that

if a substantial portion of the damages are "soft", the trial

G-<214
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a motion

for

remittitur.

However, it is not a factor to determine the ratio.

The Utah

Supreme Court has never suggested that "soft" damages are not
real or should not be compensated.
Though the amount of so-called
approximately

60% of

the

total

"soft" damages comprises

compensatory

damage

award,

those damages were nevertheless real, and represented suffering
and loss sustciined by plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs7, emotional

distress was severe and of longstanding duration.

The jury was

instructed as to what properly constitutes emotional distress,
pain

and

suffering.

determination
discretion.

by

the

The

Supreme

jury

as

Court
being

has
well

affirmed

that

within

their

This Court's view is that the jury's finding was

appropriate and supported by the evidence.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of Price v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), at 1329:
The pain and suffering inflicted on the mind
and the emotions by such wrongful act of
another is no less real; and should be no
less entitled to be compensated for.
The

problem

is

not

that

emotional

harm

should

not

be

compensated, but how to insure that the damages awarded are
commensurate

with

the

emotional

harm.

In

addressing

0.?215
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problem, courts often consider whether there is physical harm
associated

with

the mental

harm.

Courts

also

examine

the

conduct of the defendant to determine whether emotional harm
will

naturally

and

reasonably

follow

therefrom.

Professor

Prosser, in discussing this issue, stated:
[W]here physical harm is lacking, the courts
will properly tend to look for more in the
way of extreme outrage as an assurance that
the mental disturbance claimed
is not
fictitious; but that if the enormity of the
outrage itself carries conviction that there
has
in fact been
severe and
serious
emotional distress which is neither feigned,
nor trivial, bodily harm is not required.
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 Cal.Rev. 40
(1956) .
The actions of Fire Insurance were extreme and outrageous.
There is nothing fictitious or trivial about the Crookstons'
bankruptcy and loss of their home and property.

Given the

egregious conduct and succeeding events, there is no doubt that
the Crookstons' claims for mental distress are real, unfeigned,
and far from trivial and therefore should be viewed as real
damage.
The

amount

reasonable

of punitive

relationship

to

damages
the

awarded

actual

must

beatr some

compensatory

damages

incurred as the jury was instructed in Instruction No. 34.
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Despite the fact that the ratio here involved is higher than
has been generally approved by the Supreme Court in the past,
here

the

defendant

is

a

multi-million

dollar

Moreover, it is this Court,s view that
displayed

an

extremely

high

degree

Fire

corporation.
Insurance has

of malice, with

actual

intent to harm for the benefit of its own financial interests,
or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great harm
to the plaintiffs based upon the reprehensible nature of the
acts involved.
The

calculation

of

the

ratio

is

simply

one

of

seven

separate elements and to be given, in this Court's view, no
greater or lesser weight than any of the other six elements.
One must not simply, mechanically apply an arbitrary ratio,
thereby allowing the ratio factor to subsume all of the other
six factors to be considered.

It is necessary and appropriate

to send a clear and unmistakable message to Fire Insurance and
others similarly situated that the type of egregious conduct
involved which results in the devastating loss, both financial
and emotional as here involved, will not be tolerated.
the jury has done.

This,

There was no evidence at all at trial that

the practices and procedures involved have in any manner been
changed

by

Fire

Insurance.

There

was

no

indication

of
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in fact, it appeared

that Fire

Insurance was pleased with the outcome of the adjustment of the
loss, and to this day has failed or refused to recognize the
wrong that it has wrought upon the plaintiffs.

If the facts

of this case do not warrant deviation from the historically
approved

ratio of punitives to compensatory

damages, it is

difficult if not impossible for this Court to conceive of a
fact situation wherein a deviation is warranted.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those delineated in
the Memorandum of the plaintiffs in opposition to defendant's
Motion for New Trial or Remittitur, this Court is not persuaded
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, and
the Motion of Fire Insurance is denied.

Counsel for plaintiffs

is directed to prepare the appropriate Order.
Dated this /^^aay of February, 1992.
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M. Douglas Bayly
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Sixth Floor, Boston Building
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Frank A. Roybal
Attorney for Defendant Fire Insurance
442 N. Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE REMITTITUR, MARCH 25, 1991

MAR 2 5 1S92
L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P. C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

C.b

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,
Plaintiffs,
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE REMITTITUR
Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.
Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for New" ¥rial or in the Alternative
Remittitur came regularly before the court on the 31st day of January, 1992, at the hour of 8:30
a.m. The parties previously filed memoranda in support and in opposition to the motion. This
court reviewed the memoranda, the Supreme Court opinion, the file materials, the transcript,
its own notes of the trial and considered extensive oral argument by counsel. Th5 court
thereafter took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on February
10, 1992, wherein the court articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its

hno&Z

I decision to deny defendant's motion. Said Memorandum Decision is fully incorporated herein
by reference.
This court reaffirms its denial of defendant's Motion for New Trial and Remittitur and
reaffirms its conclusion that the punitive damage award should not be reduced. In so doing, the
I court expresses the following conclusions in conjunction with its more detailed analysis of its
findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision.
1. The primary purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter serious wrongdoing
which is destructive to the social fiber of our society. The severity of the punishment should
I coincide with the severity of the wrongdoing. Likewise, the greater the potential is that the
I wrongdoing is widespread and profitable, the greater the need is for deterrence.
I

2. Regarding the purpose of punishment, the court has carefully analyzed the nature and

II extent of defendant's wrongdoing and the effect thereof. It is this court's view that Fire
I1 Insurance has displayed an extremely high degree of malice, with actual intent to harm for the
I benefit of its own financial interests, or at the very least, a high degree of likelihood of great
! harm to the plaintiffs. Defendant's actions were reprehensible and involved intentional fraud
for financial gain. Defendant's wrongdoing had devastating effects upon the Crookstons and to
1

a lesser degree, many other innocent parties.

Defendant's wrongdoing was particularly

aggravating and reprehensible due to the nature of its business, i.e. marketing, advertising and
selling "peace of mind" and "hope" to those who had been devastated by catastrophic events.
When an insurer is called upon to perform, its insureds are often victims of tragic events,
leaving them financially and emotionally vulnerable. The potential adverse effect on the lives

0^239
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of family members, neighbors, employers and others is also great. Under these circumstances,
intentional fraud for profit is even more culpable. The severity of defendant's actions in this
case requires a severe punishment and the punitive damage award of $4,000,(300 is not overly
severe.
3. The second purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is equally applicable in this
case. Defendant's conduct and lack of remorse incident thereto, not just at the time of the
wrongful conduct but even thereafter throughout the litigation, demonstrate a calculated and
calloused attitude toward the settlement of claims, and this was in accord with what agents of
defendant perceived to be in keeping with their company policy. The wrongdoing in this case
was motivated by financial gain. When dealing with a multi-million dollar corporation which
appears to have a prevailing philosophy that justifies unscrupulous behavior for financial gain,
ij a significant punitive damage award is required to obtain the desired result of bringing
?' defendant's practices into harmony with common moral conduct, accepted business ethics and
the requirements of the law.
i

4. This court concludes that the most effective means of punishing and deterring the
defendant in this case is through a significant punitive damage award. Insurance companies are
generally regulated by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah. This case illustrates the
lack of deterrent effect of the Insurance Department. After Crookstons filed a complaint with
the Insurance Department, defendant's regional office denied any responsibility to the
Crookstons. The Insurance Department then advised the Crookstons that it could do nothing
further and that Crookstons would need to seek a judicial remedy. As in this case, there is
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nearly always a large disparity between the financial resources of an insurer and its insured,
particularly after a catastrophic loss. The deterrent value of punitive damages is one of the very
few equalizing tools an injured party has against a multimillion dollar corporation which engages
in such wrongful practices.
5. The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages in this case exceeds the
presumptive ratio set by the Utah Supreme Court in the Crookston opinion. (On page 19 of the
I Memorandum Decision this court erred in computing the ratio in this case. The ratio should be
3.47 to 1 instead of 2.88 to 1 and the Memorandum Decision is therefore amended accordingly.)
j For the reasons set forth above, a ratio greater than the presumptive ratio is justified.
I Defendant, by the very nature of its business, has the capacity and expertise to calculate in
| advance its exposure to liability and spread the cost thereof, thus diminishing the deterrent effect
ji of punitive damages if limited by a ratio or ceiling. In this case the relative importance of the
jl presumptive ratio should therefore be less.
|

6. The collective analysis of the seven factors upon which a punitive damage award is

!! based weighs heavily in favor of sustaining the $4,000,000 award. In fact, with the exception
of the presumptive ratio, all of the seven factors support the award. If the facts of this case do
; not warrant deviation from the historically approved ratio of punitive to compensatory damages,
it is difficult if not impossible for this court to conceive of a fact situation wherein a deviation
is warranted,
i

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange's Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Remittitur is denied.
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DATED this

#%T.of March, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dednfs Ffedej
Distrtk/Court
Approved as to Form:
STRONG & HANNI

By:
Philip R. Fishier
Stephen J. Trayner
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